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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLEY RAY RICHARDS,
DELORES R. MERKLEY, and
GORDON A. RICHARDS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No. 860536

vs.

Priority
Category No. 13b

VERNON RICHARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondents join in the Issues Presented for Review statement
made by Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Respondents join in Appellant's statement of the Nature
of the Case.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.

Respondents join in Appellantfs statement of Disposition
of the Case Below.
C.

Statement of the Facts.

Respondents agree generally with the outline of facts
set forth in the brief of Appellant as to Statement of Facts.
However, Appellant does not accurately set forth the posture
of the case before the Trial Court and this supplemental Statement
of Facts is therefore necessary.

The Pleadings
Respondents1 complaint against Appellant sets forth a
cause of action against Appellant on the theory that the Appellant
has held in trust assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards in
which each of the Respondents have an interest and that Appellant
was therefore a trustee for Respondents and owed a fiduciary
duty to them in the handling of the assets of the estate of
Lloyd Richards.
The prayer of the complaint requested the Trial Court
to require Appellant to account to Respondents for his handling
of assets in which they had an interest.

The prayer requested

the Trial Court to determine sums due from Appellant to Respondents
which/ it was Respondents' allegations/ Appellant had wrongfully/
willfully/ and without just cause withheld from Respondents.
Jurisdiction in the Trial Court was claimed by Respondents
under Sections 75-7-201/ Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 75-7-203/
Utah Code Annotated 1953/ fixes venue in the county where the
trust has its principal place of administration.

Respondents

also believe that Section 75-7-205 creates jurisdiction in the
Third Judicial District Court/ Appellant's place of residence.
Appellant removed the assets in which Respondents claim an interest
from Uintah County to Salt Lake County.
Appellant was named as the executor of both the Bertha
Richards estate and the Lloyd Richards estate in the wills that
had not been offered to probate.
Section 75-3-203 grants priority to the Appellant to be
appointed personal representative.

Priority continues only

for 45 days.

Bertha V. Richards died on July 21, 1983.

Richards died on September 26, 1983.

Lloyd

Respondents1 complaint

was filed in Salt Lake County on the 24th of June, 1985, 23
months after Berthafs death, 20 months after Lloyd Richards1
death.
On the 15th of March, 1986, Appellant in the above-entitled
action filed an affidavit in this matter, to which affidavit
he attached wills of both Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards,
neither of which had been filed for probate by him even though
he was named as executor in both wills.

(See Affidavit of Vernon

Richards, R. 52).
Both wills provided for equal distribution of the estates
among the Respondents and Appellant after the death of Bertha
and Lloyd Richards.
Estate of Bertha Richards
The family, including Lloyd Richards, met at the home
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards after Bertha's death.
to this action were present.

All parties

At the family conference, it was

discovered that Bertha Richards had decided to make a different
distribution of her estate and distribute a gift of $1,000.00
to each of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
discussed this distribution with Respondent Merkley.

She had
Exhibit

2 is a breakdown showing the distribution of her estate considering
the fact that there were different grandchildren and great-grandchildre
to be taken into account.

She had obtained during her lifetime

certificates of deposit in the name of each of her four children

in the sum of $20,000.00.

Applying her formula of making a

$1,000.00 gift to each of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren,
an unequal distribution then would occur between the Appellant
and the three Respondents1 families.
children and no grandchildren.

Appellant had only two

Shirley Richards, Respondent,

had 5 children and 11 great-grandchildren.

Delores Merkley,

Respondent, had 5 grandchildren and 10 great-grandchildren.
Laddie (or Gordon) Richards, Respondent, had 6 grandchildren
and 13 great-grandchildren.

On the bottom of Exhibit 2, the

unequal distribution is spelled out.

The distribution resulted

in the Appellant's family receiving from the estate of Bertha
Richards $22,000.00, Shirley Richards's family $36,000.00, Delores
Merkley's family $35,000.00, and Laddie Richards's family $39,000.00c
Bertha's planned distribution is the chief complaint that Appellant
makes as far as the estates are concerned.
At the family conference, father Lloyd Richards objected
to the distribution as set forth in the proposal of Bertha Richards.
His objections were that loans charged against Vernon Richard's
share of Bertha's estate shown on Exhibit 2 to be $9,577.26,
and loans charged against Delores Merkley's share of $5,000.00
were not proper since loans to other Respondents were being
forgiven and not shown on Exhibit 2.

Lloyd Richards indicated

that if these loans were charged against Vernon and Delores,
he would make it up to them by giving them additional gifts
in his estate (R. ).

Members of the family then agreed that they would not
deduct the loans from Vernon's share of Bertha's estate nor from
Delores Merkley's share of Bertha's estate.
Following the family conference/ adjustments of the agreed
distribution of Bertha Richards' estate were made.

The adjustment

required Gordon (Laddie) Richards/ a Respondent/ and Shirley
Richards/ a Respondent/ to pay a part of the sums distributed
to them to Appellant Vernon Richards and to Respondent Delores
Merkley.
Exhibit 1 shows that the adjustment required Shirley Richards
to return $4,234.28 and Laddie Richards to return $3,622.66.
These two items were then distributed as follows:

Vernon

Richards, Appellant, received $6,987.57 and Delores Merkley
received $869.41.
Appellant denies that he agreed to this settlement of the
estate

of Bertha Richards.

However, he does not deny receiving

from Shirley Richards a check for $4,234.28 on or about August 20,
1983 and cashing said check which has on its face a legend
"balance of inheritance" (Exhibit 6). Nor does he deny receiving
from Laddie (Gordon) Richards a check for $2,757.00 dated
August 24, 1983.

These two checks total $6,981.28, $3.71 more

than the amount shown to be due to Vernon on Exhibit 1 received
by the Court.

Exhibit 7 shows that Laddie (Gordon) Richards

paid Delores Merkley $870.00, which would be 59C more than the
amount shown to be due her on Exhibit 1.
The family also divided up personal property that was in
the home following Bertha's death and prior to Lloyd's death.

Each of the parties/ including the Appellant/ took the personal
property that was allocated to them by the family conference.
Lloyd Richards died just a month after the distributions were
completed and the checks delivered to Appellant and Respondent
Delores Merkley.
Respondent Delores Merkley helped her mother in dividing
up her estate and making the allocations to take care of the
fact that she wished to make a gi£t of $1/000,00 to each of
her grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

Evidence on this

fact is undisputed and documented.
It is the Respondents1 position that the estate of Bertha
Richards was distributed without probate and that all of the
parties to this action accepted and ratified the distribution
prior to the death of Lloyd Richards and prior to the filing
of the complaint in this action on June 24, 1985.

(Tr. Pg 2)

Estate of Lloyd Richards
After the death of Lloyd Richards on September 26/ 1983/
Appellant gathered up all of the papers and documents and items
in the safe at the home of Lloyd Richards, took a motor home
titled to Lloyd Richards, and removed those assets to Salt Lake
City.

A list of items removed is Exhibit C attached to the

deposition of Vernon Richards which is in his wife's handwriting.
(Pg 13, Deposition of Vernon Richards)
Prior to the death of Lloyd Richards, Vernon had obtained
an Assignment of Contract on sale of real property executed
by Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards.
contract.

This is the Williams

The escrow agent for Lloyd Richards and Bertha Richards,
First Security Bank of Vernal, then paid to Vernon Richards
the balance owing on the contract as they received it.

Vernon

Richards also gathered out of bank accounts on which his name
was a co-signator with his father Lloyd Richards monies that
were on deposit at

the time of the death of Lloyd Richards.

The amount received on the Williams contract was $19,442.91,
amounts withdrawn from checking accounts at Zions First National
and First Security Bank was $10,874.09, or a total of $30,317.00.
This information was supplied by Appellant (Ex. 33). Appellant
purchased three $10,000.00 savings certificates at Valley Bank
& Trust Company.

Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 are photostats of those

savings certificates numbered 102767, 102759 and 102758.
savings certificates were purchased in July, 1984.
a legend as to ownership.

The

Each bears

Exhibit 15 shows ownership to be

"Vernon L. Richards for the estate of Lloyd and Bertha Richards".
Exhibit 16 shows Vernon L. Richards "(estate of Lloyd and Bertha
Richards)".

Exhibit 17 shows Vernon L. Richards "(estate of

Lloyd and Bertha Richards)".
Out of the cash received in these transactions, Vernon
Richards paid the burial expense for Lloyd Richards.
Vernon Richards had, prior to his father's death, obtained
the title to the motor home.
father.

It was endorsed in blank by his

The motor home itself remained in Vernal in the possession

of Lloyd Richards until his death.
motor home for $9,000.00.

Vernon Richards sold the

The home at Vernal of Lloyd Richards was deeded to Shirley
Ray Richards, Vernon L. Richards, Delores Merkley, and Gordon
Andrew Richards on August 5/ 1983/ each to have an undivided
one-fourth interest (Ex. D7 attached to the depositions of the
parties).
The evidence demonstrated that during the lifetime of
Bertha and Lloyd Richards, they on many occasions had loaned
money to their children.
2

The items on the accounting/ Exhibit

shows two of such loans/ one to Vernon Richards/ Appellant/

of $9,577.26, and one to Delores Merkley of $5,000.00.

These

loans, in the settlement of Bertha's estate, were effectively
forgiven by parties to this action.

It is the testimony that

Lloyd Richards said, "all loans are forgiven" (R.243 ). The
family conference arrived at the agreement that Vernon's $9,577.26
should not be deducted from his share and that Delores's $5,000.00
should not be deducted from her share.

This workout is shown

on Ex. 1.
The Pleadings
An examination of the Complaint by Respondents and the
Answer and Counterclaim by Appellant will reveal that Respondents
alleged that Vernon Richards was in possession of assets owned
by the estate of Lloyd Richards and held said assets as trustee
for the four children of Lloyd Richards.

The Answer and Counterclaim

of Appellant, paragraph 4, admitted that Appellant had picked
up the papers, documents and assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards
and exercised control over said assets.

A specific denial in

paragraph 4 was that he exercised control over assets in the
hands of the Respondents.

Paragraph 4 admits that the assets

of the estate of Lloyd Richards belong equally to Appellant
and Respondents.

Respondents actually avers that all of the

assets of Lloyd Richards belong in equal shares to Respondents
and Appellant.
Paragraph 6 of the Answer and Counterclaim of Appellant
admits that he has possession of personal property belonging
to the estate of Lloyd Richards.

Paragraph 8 admits that Appellant

has received payments owed to the estate of Lloyd Richards.
Paragraph 10 of the Answer and Counterclaim has a direct assertion
by Appellant that Respondents are each entitled to a one-fourth
undivided interest in all assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards/
including assets that are in the hands of Appellant.
There is in Appellant's Answer and Counterclaim a Third
Defense/ a Fourth Defense/ a Fifth Defense/ a Sixth Defense/
and a Seventh Defense/ but at no point in the Answer does the
Appellant claim to be the sole owner of the assets that were
in the estate of Lloyd Richards.
The Counterclaim of the Appellant sets forth a claim based
only on the distribution of the assets of the estate of Bertha
Richards.

The Second Claim for Relief in that Counterclaim

sets forth claims against the Respondents for loans made by
Lloyd Richards during his lifetime and for distribution of assets
of the estate of Lloyd Richards by Respondents.

In the Counterclaim

Appellant makes no mention of any claim that he has on the assets

by reason of being a joint tenant or makes no claim that said
assets were a gift by Lloyd Richards to Appellant.
The first claim made by Vernon Richards/ Appellant/ that he
was intended to be a joint tenant and take the assets held in his
name and his father's name as joint tenants without recognizing
interests of the other children is on the last day of trial after
Judge Dee had indicated that a surviving joint tenant could make
such a claim (Tr. p. 505-507).
Assets of the Estate of Lloyd Richards
The assets of the estate of Lloyd Richards at the time of
trial consisted of three money market certificates of $10/000.00
each/ Exhibits 15, 16 and 17.

All three were bought by Appellant

in July of 1984 and represent the proceeds from the bank account
of Lloyd Richards and the payments made on the contract between
Lloyd and Bertha Richards and Williams.

Each certificate identifies

the certificate as related to the estate of Lloyd and Bertha
Richards.
An asset also of the estate of Lloyd Richards was an automobile
which was sold by Respondent Laddie (Gordon) Richards.

The proceeds

from said automobile were divied one-fourth to each of the
Respondents and Appellant.

It is apparent that the title to this

automobile was signed in blank by Lloyd Richards during his
lifetime.

The motorhome that Appellant now makes claim to was

in the possession of Lloyd Richards at the time of his death.
Title to it was in blank and signed by Lloyd Richards.
notarized

Appellant

his fatherfs signature and filled in his own name

as transferee (R . p. 467). Additional assets of the estate of
Lloyd Richards are 2-3/4 shares of Central Irrigation Company
stock and 31 shares of Steinaker water in the Central Canal
Company.

It is undisputed that these assets are assets of the

estate of Lloyd Richards and should be divided equally among the
four children.
An additional bank account was discovered in which Respondent
Delores Merkley was named as a joint tenant with Bertha V. Richards.
Respondent Merkley acknowledged that this bank account was the
asset of the estate and should be divided equally among the four
parties to this action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPER.

POINT II:

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

POINT III:

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DISTRIBUTES THE
ASSETS OF BERTHA AND LLOYD RICHARDS AS
THEY INTENDED.

POINT IV:

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE AND
APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE CLEAR.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPER.

Appellant, after trial was scheduled, moved the trial
court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, or, in the alternative,
stay the proceedings so that probate could be started in Uintah
County.

Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on the 24th of June, 1985,

trial was set for the 8th of April, 1986, the motion by Appellant

to dismiss/ or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings was filed
on the 14th of March, 1986, ten months after suit was begun.
These motions were considered by the court and denied.
Respondents1 Complaint is based on a theory that Appellant
had in his possession assets which he held in trust for them and
over which he had absolute control and for which he had not made
any accounting nor distribution.

Appellant acknowledged to the

last day of trial that Respondents were entitled to an equal share
of the assets with himself, but would not implement his
acknowledgment by action.
It was the position of the Respondents that as to the
estate of Bertha Richards, the estate had been completely
distributed and that no probate of her will was necessary.

There

was a will providing for equal distribution among the four parties
to this action.

It nominated Appellant to be the personal

representative.

However, this priority continued only for 45 days

after the date of death.

(See Sec. 75-3-203, UCA 1953).

Respondents argue that the failure on the part of Appellant
to commence probate of the Bertha V. Richards will is evidence
of two things:

(1) that he knew the estate had been fully and

completely distributed, (2) that the distribution made of Bertha's
estate was

satisfactory to him as well as to all of the other

heirs.
The Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay
Proceedings filed just 22 days before trial was scheduled and
two years and approximately eight months after the death of
Bertha Richards has little substance to support Appellant's

claim that he was not satisfied with the distribution made by
the family members of the assets of Bertha V. Richards.
Section 75-3-101/ UCA 1953/ provides that the assets of
an estate devolve to the heirs of the deceased person upon death
whether probate is commenced or not.

All of the parties who were

interested in the distribution of the assets of Bertha V. Richards
were before the court.

It could dispose of every conceivable

contention or claim.
Section 75-3-102/ UCA 1953/ provides specifically that a
will/ though not admitted to probate/ may be admitted as evidence
of a devise.

Bertha V. Richards1 will was considered by the

trial court.

Accomplishing her intentions as shown by her will

and the other documents presented was the end the trial court
achieved.
The editorial comment in Section 75-3-102 provides insight
into the legislature's intentions.

It states as follows

concerning provisions of the section:
"Rather they are designed
requirements inapplicable
survivors of the decedent
was no point to probating
have had knowledge."

to make the probate
where circumstances led
to believe that there
a will of which they

The comment is applicable to the circumstances surrounding the
family of Bertha V. Richards.

It is undisputed they agreed on

a distribution and all parties took their shares without a
serious controversy.
Appellant at trial stated that he did not agree to this
settlement of the Bertha Richards estate.

He admitted that he

took his share of the .personal roperty/ that he accepted the
checks from Shirley Ray Richards and Gordon A. Richards necessary
to implement the family settlement agreed on in August of 1983
(See Ex. 6-7)/ and cashed the distribution checks without comment.
The real dispute that Vernon Richards/ Appellant/ has
with the distribution of the Bertha V. Richards estate is not
with the Respondents but with Bertha.

The decision made by the

trial court resolved the issue in favor of Bertha's clear,
undisputed expressions of what she desired to occur with her
worldly goods.
Bertha wanted her children/ grandchildren/ and greatgrandchildren to receive a token of her affection and provided
for a $1/000.00 gift to each of the grandchildren and greatgrandchildren prior to her death (R. p.243/ Ex. 2 ) .
When these sums are paid out/ the family of the Respondents
considered as a whole receive a substantially larger amount of
money than the family of Appellant.

Gifts to Bertha's children

are equal/ but family gifts would then be unequal (Ex. 2 ) .
Up to the time of trial/ Respondents believed this dispute
over Bertha's estate was the only thing that kept the parties
from settling not only the Bertha V. Richards estate but the
Lloyd Richards estate.
Appellant changed his position during trial and now insists
that he is entitled to a larger portion of the Lloyd Richards
estate by reason of the joint tenancy and assignment of the
Williams contract.
The same sections of the Probate Code apply to the
handling of the Lloyd Richards estate as are set forth and

applicable to the Bertha Richards estate.

There was a will

nominating Appellant as the executor of the estate of Lloyd
Richards.

Lloyd died on September 26, 1983.

The will was not

filed for probate prior to commencement of this action on
June 24, 1985, two years and nine months after death.

The Lloyd

Richards estate provides for equal distribution among the
Respondents and Appellant.

Conduct of the parties again

demonstrates that they did not believe it was necessary under
the state of assets to probate Lloyd Richards1 estate.

Vernon

Richards acknowledged the interest of the Respondents in the
assets of Lloyd Richards and that he acted as their fiduciary
(see pleadings).
Section 75-7-202, UCA 1953, governs trusts.

It provides

that a trustee submits personally to jurisdiction of the courts
of this state when he accepts the trust.

It is the position of

the Respondents that Appellant has accepted a trust in the state
of Utah and has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state by such conduct.

Section 75-7-202(3) provides

that unless otherwise designated i nthe trust instrument, the
principal place of administration

of a

trust is the trustee's

usual place of business where the records pertaining to the
trust are kept, or at the trustee's residence.
It is undisputed that Appellant removed the property in
which Respondents have an interest from Uintah County to Salt Lake
County.

it is undisputed that Appellsant resides in Salt Lake

County.

It seems obvious that not only jurisdiction but venue

is proper in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County*
POINT II.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The findings of fact by the court are supported by clear
and convincing evidence and in most instances by undisputed
evidence.
1.

The following items are undisputed:
The wills of Bertha V. Richards and Lloyd Richards

provided for equal distribution among their children of their
estates.
2.

Both wills named Appellant asexecutor.

Neither will

was ever filed for probate by Appellant or Respondents prior to
the commencement of this action on the 24th of June, 1985.
3.

The family, following the death of Bertha V. Richards

and while Lloyd Richards was alive/ held a family conference and
settled the estate of Bertha V. Richards.

Settlement required

two of Respondents to contribute from their shares as specified
by Bertha to the share of Appellant and the other Respondent.
Distribution included many items of personal poroperty which were
segregated and taken by all of the parties.

Appellant and

Respondent Merkley accepted checks from Respondents Shirley Ray
Richards and Gordon A. Richards for the amounts calculated to be
necessary to settle their shares in Bertha V. Richards1 estate.
4.

Appellant took into his possession all of the papers

and the motorhome which were in the possession of Lloyd Richards
prior to his death following his death
5.

on September 26/ 1983.

Appellant acknowledged that the assets in his

possession were assets of the estate of Bertha and Vernon Richards,

but failed to make any accounting or distribution of the assets
between the 26th of September, 1983 and the commencement of the
legal action before the court on the 24th of
6.

June, 1985.

Lloyd Richards, during his lifetime, signed in blank

titles to his motorhome, to his family automobile, and executed
an assignment of a contract between himself and Bertha Rcihards,
as sellers, and Robert H. Williams, as buyer, to Appellant.
7.

Appellant has received all

payments from the escrow

agent, First Security Bank, and invested said funds, together
with other funds received by him from the First Security Bank of
Vernal and Zions First National Bank, in savings certificates
bearing the following legends:
Exhibit 17:

Savings certificate No. 102758 in the
amount of $10,000.00 dated July 18, 1984,
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing
legend "Vernon L. Richards (estate of Lloyd
and Bertha Richards)".

Exhibit 16:

Savings certificate No. 102759 in the
amount of $10,000.00, dated July 18, 1984,
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing legend
"Vernon L. Richards (estate of Bertha and
Lloyd Richards)".

Exhibit 15:

Savings certificate No. 102767 in the
amount of $10,000.00 dated July 23, 1984,
Valley Bank & Trust Company, bearing legend
"Vernon L. Richards for the estate of
Lloyd and Bertha Richards".

8.

The monies used to purchase the savings certificates

came from the following resources of Lloyd Richards:

$19,442.91

from Williams contract, $2,942.41 from the First Security Bank of

Utah, Vernal Branch, Account No. 123000012-062-11926-16, and
$7,931.68 from the bank account of Vernon Richards at Zions First
National Bank, Vernal Branch, Account No. 26-31432-8, a total of
$30, 317.00.

The balance left over of $317.00 was held in a bank

account by Appellant.
9.

The home of Lloyd and Bertha Richards described as

all of Lot 4, Meadow Park Subdivision, Vernal, Uintah County, Utah,
was deeded by Lloyd Richards during his lifetime to the Respondents
and Appellant in equal shares.
10.

A 1982 Chrysler automobile owned by Lloyd Richards was

sold following the death of Richards by Respondent Gordon A.
Richards and the proceeds distributed one-fourth to each Respondent
and one-fourth to Appellant.

Title to said vehicle was endorsed

in blank by Lloyd richards prior to his death.
11.

A bank account at First Security Bank, No. 62-813-9128,

with a balance of $2,669.14 in the joint names of Bertha Richards
and Delores Merkley, Delores Merkley acknowledges is to be shared
equally by the Respondents and Appellant.
12.

In the contract of sale by Lloyd Richards and Bertha

Richards to Robert H. Williams, the water rights on the property
sold and the mineral rights were reserved by Lloyd and Bertha
Richards.

The water rights consist of 2-3/4 shares of Central

Irrigation Company stock and 31 shares of Steinaker wter in the
Central Canal Company, Certificates No. 683 and 3729.

All parties

acknowledge that they are entitled to a one-fourth interest in
these properties.

13.

Lloyd Richards during his lifetime deeded by warranty

deed to Shirley Ray Richards, his son, a piece of real property
containing 3.8 acres located in Vernal, Utah.
14.

The Respondents and Appellant, in distributions made

of personal items both following the death of Bertha Richards and
following the death of Lloyd Richards, attempted to distribute
the personal effects equally between Respondents and Appellant.
15.

It is uncontroverted that the following testimony

describes what happened following Bertha!s death:
"A
We talked — mostly dad kind of give us
instructions of what he expected and all. And at
that time he said tht all debts were to be forgiven
up to that time, his and mother's both. Then — then
he said he would give us the savings certificates that
mother had had made out to each one of us and we could
all go to the bank and cash those in. And I think it
was the next day after that that we done that.
Q
Did he then, at that meeting, distribute savings
certificates?
A
No, not at that meeting. He waited until we
were all ready to go to the bank.
Q

Then what happened?

A
He give us the certificates, and we all went down
to the — well we went to Zions Bank first and cashed
those certificates that were there to be cashed, and
then went across the road to First Security and cashed
those over there.
Q
Now, in that distribution, Mr. Richards, was the
Money Market Certificates and the balance in your
checking account included?
A
Yes. Her checking account, she had pretty well
bought these certificates with, and I think she kept
a little bit in there for — for her burial purposes
and stuff."
(Tr. p. 243)
The court's findings are thus supported by clear and
convincing evidence.

POINT III.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DISTRIBUTES THE
ASSETS OF BERTHA AND LLOYD RICHARDS
AS THEY INTENDED.

Court found that it was the intentions of Bertha Richards
and Lloyd Richards/ set forth in both wills/ to divide their
estates equally among their children.

Court then found that

during the lifetime of Bertha Richards and Lloyd Richards/
distributions were made which did not result in equal distribution
to their children (see Paragraph 21 of Findings/ R. p. 211).
It found that the distributions consummated during the lifetime
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards were in accordance with their wishes
and desires.
Court found that the items listed in the Findings of Fact/
paragraph 6, (a) the mobile home/ (b) real estate contract balance
from Robert H. Williams/ (c) bank accounts in First Security
Bank of Utah/ Vernal Branch/ (d) bank account at Zions First
National Bank/ Vernal Branch/ (e) water rights in Central
Irrigation Company and Steinaker water in the Central Canal
Company/ (f) mineral rights on land sold to Robert H. Williams/
were not distributed during the lifetime of Lloyd Richards and
Bertha Richards.

That it was the intentions of Lloyd and Bertha

Richards that their children share equally in those items.
Court found that the consummated gifts and distributions
made by both deceased parents were demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence and that no fraud/ misrepresentations or
undue influence was practiced on either of the deceased parents.
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Court found that since the death of Bertha and Lloyd
Richards, the heirs have, through their repeated transactions,
demonstrated and acknowledged awareness of the intention of
their parents as found by the court.

Court then found that

the assets in the possession of Appellant as listed in paragraph 6,
those items listed specifically herein, have been held by Appellant
as a trustee for himself and the other heirs of Lloyd and Bertha
Richards and that the duty of fidelity arises and has existed
since their death.

That accountings by Appellant as trustee of

the earnings are reequired as a result of the fiduciary
relationship.
Court refused to award attorney!s fees to parties.
The judgment of the court then provides that each of
the parties are to share one-fourth interest in the mobile home,
the proceeds from the real estate contract with Williams, the
bank accounts at First Security Bank of Utah and

Zions First

National Bank, the water rights, the mineral rights, the bank
account in which Delores Merkley is a joint owner with Bertha
Richards.

Judgment further ordered the parties to cooperate

in selling the

home at Vernal, Utah and ordered that the proceeds

be divided one-fourth to each of Respondents and Appellant.
Judgment recognized the distribution to Shirley Ray Richards of
the 3.8 acres of land as one free of any claims of the other
children.

It adjudged that each of the parties was the owner

free and clear of any other party to the other items distributed

prior to the death of Lloyd Richards or subsequent thereto, to
which distributions there have been no objections made.
Judgment determined that as to the items of property in
the possession of Appellant and Respondent Delores R. Merkley,
that said parties are trustees, the benefit of the Respondents
and Appellant.
Judgment orders the trustees to liquidate said properties
and distribute equally among the beneficiaries the items listed
within a reasonable time following entry of the judgment.

It

orders a coooperation among the members of the family in selling
the family home at Vernal.

Appellant was retained as trustee,

but a provision was made that if he physically was unable to
handle the work of liquidating the assets, then the Respondent
Gordon A. Richards would be appointed successor trustee.
Court made a specific judgment that tehre were no known
creditors of Bertha or Lloyd Richards and that the heirs of
Bertha and Lloyd are Respondents and Appellant.
The findings, conclusions and judgment are supported by
clear and convincing evidence, much of which is undisputed.
POINT IV.

A.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE AND
APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE CLEAR.

The Probate Code, Section 75-1-102(2), UCA 1953, clearly
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states the basic considerations applied by the trial court.
It reads:
2. "The underlying purposes and policies of this code
are: (b) to discover and make effective the intent of
a decedent in distribution of his property".
If there can be any question about this principle being
applicable, the common law background has established the rule
for the past thousand years, which is "the cardinal rule in the
construction of wills and codicils is that the intention of the
testator must be ascertained if possible and if it is not in
contravention of some established rule of law or public policy,
must be given effect."

95 CJS Section 590, p. 731,

Hundreds

of cases are cited to support the principle which Respondents
believe is uncontrovertible.
B.

Appellant was the son and nominated personal

representative of both parents and a confidential relationship
existed be'tween them and him.

The transfers and transactions

between the deceased parents and Appellant show no consideration
running from Appellant to the parent.
This court has set down the principle applicable clearly
in the case of Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (1978).

Language

of the case is as follows:
"Whether litigants were in confidential relationship
at the time of the transactions about which they
litigate is ordinarily a question of fact and is not
to be found on the basis of mere friendship or social
or religious affiliation between the parties. There
are a few relationships (such as parent-child,
attorney-client, trustee-destui) which the law presumes
to be confidential."

With a confidential relationship existing/ this court
has ruled that the transaction which benefits one in whom
confidence is placed creates a presumption that the transction
is unfair and shifts the burden of proving that it was a fair
transaction from the Respondents to Appellant.

In Cunningham v.

Cunningham/ 690 P.2d 549 (1984), the court recites the principle
applicable here in the following language:
"When a confidential relationship exists between
parties/ and a transaction occurs that benefits the
one in whom confidence is placed/ a presumption
arises that the transaction is unfair. E.g./
Bradbury v. Rasmussen/ 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 401 P.2d
710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the benefiting party
the burden to persuade the court that there was no
fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other.
In re Swan's Estate/ 4 Utah 2d 277, 293,293 P.2d 682,
693 (1956). From the findings of the trial court/
which are amply supported by the evidence/ the burden
was properly shiftted to defendants/ and they wholly
failed to carry it. The fact that they were in
1
somewhat good faith1 is not enough to free them from
the consewquences of their actions. The deed should
have been voided. Seequist v. Seequist/ 524 P.2d 598
(Utah 1974); Albright v. Medoff/ 54 Or. App. 143,
634, P.2d 479 (1981)."
A subsequent holding by this court restates the principle
relied on by Respondents.
(1985).

It is Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766

The court sets down the principle in the following

language:
"However, if a confidential relationship is found to
exist between parties, any transaction that benefits
the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to have
been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence
and fraud. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d at 383,
401 P.2d at 713; Cunningham v. Cunningham, Utah,
690 P.2d 549, 553 (1984); The benefiting party then
bears the burden of persuading the fact finder by a
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction
was in fact fair and not the result of fraud or undue
influence. if that burden is not carried, the
transaction will be set aside. In re Swan's Estate,

4 Utah 2d 277, 293, 293 P.2d 682,693 (1956);
Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 43-44, 337 P.2d
420, 422 (1959); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d
at 383, 401 P.2d at 713; Cunningham v. Cunningham,
690 P.2d at 553."
The conduct of the parties, the conduct of the decedents,
provide adequate basis for the courtfs determination that clear
and convincing evidence supported the finding that Appellant was
to act as fiduciary in the handling of the property in the Lloyd
Richards estate for the benefit of himself and his brothers and

The closest case on the basic facts that Respondents have
been able to find is Culley v., Culley, 404 P.2d 657, 17 Utah 2d
62 (1965).

There this court announced in a similar situation

its opinion as follows:
"On the basis of claimant's own testimony, it seems
incontestable that the trial court could reasonably
find as it did, that neither he or his father
intended that he should have any interest in this
bank account while his father lived. As in other
matters of proof, whether the evidence is sufficient
to meet the necessary rewquirements of being clear
and convincing, is largely for the trial court to
determine because of its advantaged position.
Under the traditional rules of review, which require
us to survey the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the trial court's findings, we can see
no basis for reversing the judgment."
It is respectfully submitted thsat the evidence is clear
and convincing that Lloyd Richards intended that his estate
should be divided equally among his children, that the children
understood this to be his intention, and their conduct following
his

death demonstrates such understanding.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 1987.

DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Respondents

